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Tuition fees and sunk-cost effects∗
Nadine Ketel† Jona Linde‡
Hessel Oosterbeek§ Bas van der Klaauw¶
Abstract
This paper reports on a field experiment testing for sunk-cost effects in an education
setting. Students signing up for extra-curricular tutorial sessions randomly received a
discount on the tuition fee. The sunk-cost effect predicts that students who pay more
will attend more tutorial sessions, with possibly beneficial effects on their performance.
For our full sample, we find no support for this hypothesis, neither on attendance nor on
performance. Results are consistent with a sunk-cost effect for the subsample of students
who, based on hypothetical survey questions, are identified as sunk-cost prone. We do
not find differential effects by students’ income or parental contributions.
JEL-codes: C93; D03; I22
Key-words: Sunk-cost effect; Higher education; Field experiment
1 Introduction
Education is heavily subsidized around the world. These subsidies can lower student effort
and performance through two channels. First, higher subsidies attract more students and
the additional students may be weaker or less motivated than the average student.1 Second,
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Amsterdam through the Speerpunt Behavioral Economics.
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1Studies showing that lower tuition fees or more financial aid increase enrollment include Van der Klaauw
(2002), Kane (2003) and Dynarski (2003).
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higher subsidies may – net of selection – reduce student effort through a sunk-cost effect
(Thaler, 1980; Arkes and Blumer, 1985). Students who pay less for their study may have
lower psychological costs of failing their studies than students who pay the full price. In this
paper we present the results of a field experiment which examines this second channel.2
We run a field experiment in which we randomly subsidize Dutch university students
who have signed up for a course of extra-curricular tutorial sessions. When participants
come to pay the offer price, they may randomly receive an unexpected discount. As a result
treated and control participants have, on average, the same willingness to pay, but the actual
transaction prices they paid differ. The size of the discount is determined by randomly picking
a closed envelope, so participants have no reason to believe that the discount is related to the
quality of the course.
Sunk-cost effects can operate through loss aversion, through a taste for consistency or
through psychological commitment (Ashraf et al., 2010).3 Thaler (1980) discusses not ignor-
ing sunk costs as one of various deviations from the rational maximizing model that follow
from Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory. Eyster (2002) presents a model in which peo-
ple have a taste for rationalizing past actions by taking current actions for which those past
actions were optimal. Having spend a larger amount of money on an extra-tutorial course in
the past may then lead to a higher probability of attending a session today.
If the sunk-cost effect would be the only bias to which students are subject, it could
make them spend more than the optimal amount of effort on their education.4 There is,
however, ample evidence that due to present bias – the tendency to place too much weight
on the present compared to the future relative to the comparison of two future dates (see e.g.
Frederick et al. (2002)) –, students generally spend too little effort on their studies (Koch
et al., 2014).5 Education requires a large investment upfront, in tuition, time and effort. A
present-biased student may be unwilling to make such investments, even if the rewards justify
the costs from the perspective of the student herself when both costs and rewards are still in
2A third channel, potentially operating in the opposite direction, is an income effect. Students who pay
the full price have reduced wealth, and may, therefore, work more and “consume” fewer tutorial sessions. We
assess the importance of income effects for our study in Section 4.
3While tuition fees may trigger some psychological commitment, such pay-in-advance purchases should not
be labeled “commitment devices” according to Bryan et al. (2010), because they do not make certain – currently
undesirable – future choices more expensive.
4Although this should be considered relative to the money and effort sunk on other activities which compete
for their time. E.g. if students have sunk a large amount of money and/or effort into their membership of a
fraternity or sports team money spend on college tuition may offset these sunk-cost effects.
5For example, Levitt et al. (2012) find that rewards to perform well on a test only have an impact when
students know that payment is immediate, and not when they know that payment is delayed. This holds for
financial rewards as well as for non-financial rewards.
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the future. However, due to the sunk-cost effect an initial investment in terms of (high) tuition
fees can offset the present bias.6 This would be particularly effective if, as seems plausible,
it is mainly the daily study effort which is affected by the present bias rather than the more
carefully considered financial investment in tuition fees.
There is surprisingly little solid empirical evidence about the sunk-cost bias. For a long
time, only Arkes and Blumer (1985) provided evidence. They demonstrate the sunk-cost
effect by randomly providing theater patrons with a discount. Participants who received a
discount visited the theater significantly less often. This is, however, only the case for the
first half of the theater season; in the second half differences between the discount and the
no-discount group are no longer significant.7
Three recent studies investigate the sunk-cost effect in field experiments in developing
countries. Ashraf et al. (2010) conducted an experiment in a door-to-door sale of a water
purification product to about one thousand households in Zambia. To disentangle selection
effects from the sunk-cost effect, they use a clever two-stage pricing design that created
random and orthogonal variation in offer prices and transaction prices. Two weeks after the
sale, data were collected concerning usage of the product. The study finds no evidence of
a sunk-cost effect: households that pay a higher transaction price are not more likely to use
the product. If, however, paying a positive price is compared to paying nothing, the point
estimates are consistent with the sunk-cost effect, but are not significantly different from
zero.
Cohen and Dupas (2010) use a similar two-stage design to estimate the impact of the
offer and transaction prices on the use of antimalarial insecticide-treated bed nets offered by
prenatal clinics to pregnant women in Kenya. They also fail to find a significant sunk-cost
effect. The point estimates are negative, even when paying something is compared to paying
nothing.
Finally, Hidalgo et al. (2013) report about an experiment where free school uniforms were
provided to primary school children in deprived areas in Ecuador. To minimize selection
effects, the provision of free uniforms to treatment schools was not publicly announced and
the analysis focuses on students in the last two years of primary school. This study finds
6Education subsidies may also help to overcome present bias as they lower the required investment. Larger
financial aid to students combined with higher tuition fees may be a way out of this dilemma.
7The sunk-cost bias has also been investigated in laboratory experiments. Phillips et al. (1991) report that
some participants exhibit the sunk-cost effect when they value lottery tickets, while others experience the reverse
effect. Friedman et al. (2007) find a small sunk-cost bias in a search task, but the results are very sensitive to the
details of the task. Offerman and Potters (2006) show that higher entry fees facilitate cooperation and Meyer
(1993) that higher entree fees increase bids in an auction.
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a significantly negative effect of free provision of uniforms on school attendance measured
during three unannounced visits, which is consistent with the sunk-cost effect.
There are important differences between the studies of Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen and
Dupas (2010), and those of Hidalgo et al. (2013) and ourselves. The first difference is that the
discounts offered are far smaller in the first two studies, also compared to the participants’
earnings. A larger discount should increase the chance of finding a sunk-cost effect, which
could explain why Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen and Dupas (2010) do not find a sunk-cost
effect and Hidalgo et al. (2013) do (cf. Garland and Newport, 1991; Rodrik, 2009). However,
as a percentage of the total costs of education the discount is small in Hidalgo et al. (2013) and
our paper, especially if opportunity costs such as forgone income are included. The second
difference is the type of product, health versus education. It may be that when health is
concerned people are less likely to make explicit cost-benefit comparisons, but it is not clear
what that means for the sunk-cost bias. On the one hand explicit comparisons may lead to
more rational decisions and therefore reduce the bias, on the other hand explicit comparisons
make the cost more salient which could increase the bias.
The health and education products that we compare here, also differ in the opportunity
costs involved in using them. While water purification bottles and bed nets may have alter-
native usages, these are quite limited for education. In contrast attending school or university
involves the use of time which may have a high opportunity cost. This is also the case in
Thaler’s (1980) classic examples of driving 60 miles in a snowstorm to a basketball game,
and continuing playing tennis with an injury.
It is not a priori clear whether the context of our experiment makes it more or less likely
to find evidence for sunk-cost effects than in the other studies. The participants in our study
are drawn from a population of university students and, therefore, they are probably more
rational than the participants in the studies of Ashraf et al. (2010), Cohen and Dupas (2010)
and Hidalgo et al. (2013) who come from poor families in developing countries. At the same
time, the participants in these studies probably all had previous experiences with buying and
using water purification bottles, mosquito bed nets and school uniforms. This is likely to
improve the quality of the decision under study. In contrast, a majority of the students in our
sample have no previous experience with extra-curricular courses.
The main result of this paper is that we do not find a significant effect of sunk costs on
attendance or performance when we study the full sample. To inquire whether the absence
of sunk-cost effects is due to income effects, we have estimated whether there are differential
effects for students with above and below median monthly income, and for students who
paid themselves for the course or whose parents paid. Differences between these groups turn
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out to be minor, indicating that income effects do not explain our main result. Following
Ashraf et al. (2010) we have also looked at the subsample of students who on the basis of
hypothetical survey questions can be categorized as sunk-cost prone. For this subsample
we find a significant sunk-cost effect on attendance: sunk-cost prone students who receive a
larger discount are less likely to attend. We acknowledge, however, that the measurement of
sunk-cost proneness has some caveats.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows, Section 2 describes the setting of
our study, the experimental design and the data. Section 3 briefly discusses our empirical
approach. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Design and data
2.1 Setting
Our field experiment concerns students participating in extra-curricular tutorial sessions for
various courses at four Dutch universities. These sessions are offered by De Bijlespartner, a
company organizing additional tutorial sessions for students in cooperation with several local
study associations. This company provides study materials and recruits more senior students,
who performed well on the subject, as teachers. Each tutorial group contains between eight
and 13 students. Tutorial sessions are connected to a course offered in the regular curriculum
and these sessions run concurrently with that course. Courses at Dutch universities typically
last seven or eight weeks, the tutorial sessions take place during the final four or five weeks.8
Each week there is one tutorial session of two or three hours. Students register online through
their study association’s website for the tutorial sessions. At the start of the first session,
participants pay for the full set of four or five sessions. The listed price for a set of tutorial
sessions varies somewhat between courses and is either C60, C65 or C75. The prices are not
affected by our experiment; the company offers similar tutorials for the same prices in other
periods during the academic year.
The experiment involved five study programs at four Dutch universities: business admin-
istration and psychology at the VU University Amsterdam, economics and business at the
University of Amsterdam, social sciences at Utrecht University, and psychology at the Uni-
versity of Groningen. For each study program we carried out the experiment only during one
block of courses to prevent that students would expect to get a discount. In total, we included
8The tutorial sessions start later than the course so that students can decide in the first weeks whether or not
to take the additional tutorial sessions.
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tutorial sessions for 14 courses in our experiment. All courses are offered under the name of
the student association of the study program (not under the name of the company) which en-
sures that students would not expect a discount when hearing about discounts in other study
programs. The courses for which the tutorial sessions are offered are mainly statistics or
math courses because students find these courses particularly difficult. Table A1 in online
Appendix A lists for each study program the courses for which tutorial sessions were offered,
the full price, and the numbers of groups and participating students.
2.2 Experimental design
The goal of our field experiment is to study whether education subsidies affect study effort
and performance net of their impact through the enrollment decision. In particular, we test
for the presence of a sunk-cost effect. To generate variation in tuition fees independent of stu-
dents’ willingness to pay, we randomly gave an unexpected discount to students who already
signed up and were ready to pay the full tuition fee. We introduced four possible discounts:
a full discount (treatment Free), a discount of the full price minus C10 (treatment Large Dis-
count; LD), a discount of C10 (treatment Small Discount; SD) and no discount (treatment
Full Price). All students have an equal ex ante probability to receive each discount level.
For the experiment we took control of the payment process for the tutorial sessions. When
students registered for a set of tutorial sessions, they were informed that they had to pay in
cash at the start of the first session. When students arrived we invited them to participate in
a study on study behavior and informed them that they could get a discount. Students were
not informed about the goal of our study and were not told why randomly different discounts
were offered.9 Upon agreeing to participate students completed a questionnaire in which
they also gave permission to use their information for this study.10 The questionnaire asked,
among other things, about study habits, maximum willingness to pay and how much they
thought the tutorial would help them to pass the relevant exam. An English translation of this
pre-treatment questionnaire is in online Appendix C.
After completing the questionnaire students entered a classroom one at a time to de-
termine their discount and pay the remaining tuition fee. They were told that they had an
9Giving random discounts is comparable to the procedure marketing firms frequently use when they reward
respondents to a questionnaire by giving them the chance to win a valuable item instead of paying all respon-
dents a small amount. It is therefore unlikely that participants will infer that they are part of a randomized
experiment.
10Only two out of 373 students refused to participate and they paid the full price. Students who did not
show up for the first session or registered for the tutorial session after the official deadline were not allowed to
participate in our experiment.
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equal chance to receive any of the four possible discounts, and that the discount would be
determined by choosing a closed envelope. Before arrival of the students we prepared the
envelopes with discount tickets, including an equal number of envelopes for each discount.
When a student picked an envelope, this envelope was not replaced. The number of en-
velopes was such that the final student could choose from at least four envelopes. We chose
this procedure to make it very clear to participants that the discount is randomly determined
and unrelated to the quality of the tutorial sessions. This avoids that students infer something
about the quality of the course from the transaction price they paid. We asked students not
to reveal their discount when leaving the room to prevent students who had not paid yet from
updating probabilities for specific discounts.
During the course the teachers recorded students’ attendance at each session and reported
this to us after the course. During the final tutorial session students filled out the usual eval-
uation form to which we added some questions. These questions included a control question
to check whether students remembered their discount, their opinion about the discount and
hypothetical sunk-cost questions. An English translation of the post-treatment questionnaire
can be found in online Appendix C. If students were not present at the final session we con-
tacted them to complete the evaluation form either through email or over the phone.11 The
response rate is 94%. The results in table B1 in the online appendix show that response is
slightly higher in the group that received the large discount than in the group that received the
full price treatment, and that students in the free treatment are more likely than students in the
full price treatment to have responded through email. Since the share that responds through
email is rather small (0.04), this difference involves only few students.12 Finally, from the
university administrations we received grades for the exams of the regular course connected
to the tutorial sessions.
A possible contaminator to the sunk-cost effect is an income effect operating in the op-
posite direction. We asked students whether they paid for the tutorial sessions themselves or
whether they received extra money from others, for example, their parents. We also asked
students about their monthly income. The income effect may be less important for students
whose parents pay for the course and for students with a relatively high income. We discuss
findings for these groups in subsection 4.2.
Following Ashraf et al. (2010) we included hypothetical sunk-cost questions in the post-
11In total 70 students were not present during the last session. Of these students 14 answered the questionnaire
by mail, 38 over the phone and 18 did not answer the questionnaire at all.
12Eight students in the free treatment answered through email. In the other groups these numbers are zero
(large discount), three (small discount) and three (full price).
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treatment survey, which allows us to identify sunk-cost-prone people. We asked participants
“suppose you bought a bottle of juice for C2. When you start to drink it, you realize you
don’t really like the taste. Would you finish drinking it?” Next, we asked two follow-up
questions, for C5 and C1, “Now suppose you bought exactly the same bottle of juice for
C.. . Would you finish drinking it?”. A participant is categorized as sunk-cost prone if s/he
always finishes the bottle, or finishes the bottle when a high price has been paid and doesn’t
finish the bottle when a lower price has been paid.
One could argue that asking participants the hypothetical sunk-cost questions in the post-
treatment questionnaire may lead to respondents to try to rationalize their behavior. However,
the question was about juice, so students had to make the link from buying juice to paying
for tutorial sessions. Next, it requires that students know how often they would have attended
class when given another discount. Moreover, asking these questions in the pre-treatment
survey is less attractive because it might make the purpose of the experiment explicit. We
elaborate further on this issue in subsection 4.3.
2.3 Data
In total, 371 students registered before the official deadline and showed up for the first meet-
ing. Some students took two or three different tutorial courses at the same time and could get
a discount at each occasion. The sample of 371 observations consists of 340 unique students,
participating in 14 different courses and 39 different tutorial groups. Randomization of the
discounts took place within each tutorial group. We want to restrict the sample to full-time
students.13 Since there is no direct indicator in the data for full-time students, we drop stu-
dents who are older than 26 or earn more than C1200 a month as they are more likely to
be part-time students.14 We also exclude two students without exam information. The final
sample contains 339 observations (312 unique students).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the final sample and for each treatment group
separately. The last column presents p-values of a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations
rank test, which tests whether at least two of the four treatment groups differ significantly
from each other. Due to the 6% non-response on the post-treatment survey and some item
non-response, the numbers of observations vary somewhat between variables. Observations
13For part-time students the discount is smaller relative to their income, it can be that their employer pays for
the tutorial sessions or grades might matter for their employer. Therefore, one should expect a smaller sunk-cost
effect for part-time students.
14When these students are included, the estimates become a bit smaller but the signs and significance levels
are the same.
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are fairly equally divided over the treatment groups. Furthermore, the characteristics seem
to be well balanced over treatment groups: only one out of 16 reported p-values is smaller
than 0.10. Around 60% of the participants are female and the average age is 21.1 years.
The mean monthly income is about C570, and it is a bit higher in the groups with a lower
discount. About 60% of the participants are economics students. On average, in the pre-
treatment survey students report that they devote 27 hours per week to studying and expect
to spend slightly over 13 hours to the subject connected to the tutorial sessions. Over 30%
of the students already made at least one attempt to pass the course. Students reported that
they are willing to pay, on average, 12% more for the tutorial sessions than the full price and
believe that participation in the sessions raises the likelihood to pass the exam by, on average,
28 percentage points. Almost half of the participants report that they received extra money
from their parents to participate in the tutorial sessions. The actual number of hours that
students spent on the subject, reported in the post-treatment questionnaire, is 10.8 hours per
week. Finally, 45% of the students should be considered sunk-cost prone according to the
hypothetical-choice questions in the questionnaire.
3 Empirical strategy
This section briefly describes our empirical approach. For each outcome (attendance and
performance), we present results from the following five regressions:
Yic = α1 +β1Freei+η1LDi+θ1SDi+ γ1Xi+µ1c+ ε1ic (1)
Yic = α2 +β2Freei+ γ2Xi+µ2c+ ε2ic (2)
Yic = α3 +β3(Freei+LDi)+ γ3Xi+µ3c+ ε3ic (3)
Yic = α4 +β4(Freei+LDi+SDi)+ γ4Xi+µ4c+ ε4ic (4)
Yic = α5 +β5Discounti+ γ5Xi+µ5c+ ε5ic (5)
where Yic is the outcome variable for student i in course c; Freei, LDi and SDi are indicators
for the different treatment groups; Discounti is a continuous measure for the discount; Xi is a
vector of control variables; and the µc’s are course fixed effects. The β ’s, η1 and θ1 are the
parameters of interest.
Equation (1) includes separate dummies for the three different discount levels. This tests
for each discount level separately whether it has an impact compared to the “full price”.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Treatment
obs All Free LD SD Full price p-value
Pre-treatment survey
Female 339 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.64 0.62 0.87
Age 338 21.1 20.8 21.5 21.0 21.3 0.23
Monthly income (in C) 335 567 532 528 573 631 0.05
Economics or Business student 339 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.62 0.55 0.76
Time spend on study (per week) 338 27.0 26.9 27.5 27.2 26.4 0.87
Time spend on subject (predicted) 337 13.3 14.5 12.5 12.7 13.3 0.79
First attempt for exam 337 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.63
Max. willingness to pay (fraction of price) 333 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.13 0.55
Predicted prob. passing without tutorial 338 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.14
Predicted prob. passing with tutorial 338 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.75 0.12
Course payed by parents 339 0.49 0.51 0.44 0.54 0.45 0.63
Post-treatment survey
Sunk-costs prone 306 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.86
Quality of the course (scale 1-10) 319 7.19 7.26 7.45 7.04 7.04 0.46
Hours spent on subject per week 317 10.8 11.1 10.9 10.5 10.8 0.74
Subjective probability of passing exam 316 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.71
=1 of controls missing 339 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.98
Total number of observations 339 86 79 87 87
Note: The final column present the p-value of a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test.
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Equation (2) only includes a dummy for the “free” treatment, and, therefore, compares paying
nothing to paying something (large discount, small discount and full price jointly). This
specification tests whether paying matters.15 Equation (3) includes a dummy which equals
one for the “free” treatment and the “large discount” treatment, and, therefore, compares
these treatments jointly to the other two treatments (small discount and full price) jointly.
This specification tests whether paying (almost) nothing has a different impact than paying
(almost) the full price and therefore compares two groups of participants with a large price
difference between the groups and a small price difference within the groups. Equation (4)
includes a dummy which is one if any discount is given and thus compares getting a discount
versus paying the full price. Finally, equation (5) includes the size of the discount as fraction
of the full price as the treatment variable.16
For all five equations we present results from specifications with and without control vari-
ables. The control variables are gender, age, income, maximum willingness to pay, whether
the course is paid by someone else, average study time, whether it is the first attempt for the
exam, and the estimated probability to pass the exam without tutorial. All control variables
are measured before the randomization. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the 39
tutorial groups.
We also present results from specifications where the treatment variables are interacted
with student characteristics. The first student characteristic for which we investigate inter-
action effects is the sunk-cost-prone indicator. This allows us to examine whether the hy-
pothetical sunk-cost questions help to identify students who respond (stronger) to discounts.
The two other student characteristics that we interact with the treatment variables are: i) an
indicator for the course being paid by someone else and ii) an indicator for the student hav-
ing income above the median. With these two variables we assess the relevance of income
effects.
15This specific hypothesis was suggested to Ashraf et al. (2010) by NGO personnel regarding the use of
Clorin. They find estimates that are large and positive, but not significant. From which they conclude that
“while our data show no evidence of an effect of an act of paying, they are at least consistent with such an
effect, suggesting the need for further research.”
16Note that equations (2) to (5) are restricted versions of equation (1). The respective restrictions are: (i)
η1 = θ1 = 0; (ii) β1 = η1;θ1 = 0; (iii) β1 = η1 = θ1; (iv) β1, η1 and θ1 are proportionate to the discounts.
Recall that the full price differs somewhat between courses. Therefore, the large and small discount are a
slightly different fraction of the full price.
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Table 2. Effects of treatments on attendance
Eq Variable Always present Fraction present
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Free -0.06 (0.06) -0.11 (0.07) -0.03 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03)
LD 0.13 (0.07)* 0.07 (0.07) 0.06 (0.03)* 0.03 (0.03)
SD 0.03 (0.07) -0.04 (0.08) 0.01 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04)
(2) Free -0.11 (0.05)** -0.12 (0.05)** -0.05 (0.03)** -0.06 (0.03)**
(3) Free | LD 0.02 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
(4) Free | LD | SD 0.03 (0.06) -0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03)
(5) Discount 0.00 (0.05) -0.03 (0.05) 0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Mean dependent variable 0.69 0.69 0.86 0.86
full price treatment
Control variables no yes no yes
Observations 327 327 327 327
Note: Regressions in the even-numbered columns include controls for gender, age, income, maximum willingness to pay, course paid by
someone else, average study time, first attempt for exam and the estimated probability to pass the exam without tutorial. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***,**,* - estimates significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Furthermore, course fixed effects are included
and standard errors are clustered by tutorial group.
4 Results
We present the empirical results in three subsections. In subsection 4.1 we present estimates
of the impact of the treatments on attendance and performance. Next, asses the importance of
income effects and we look at heterogeneous treatment effects for sunk-cost prone students
in subsection 4.2. Finally, in subsection 4.3 we characterize the sunk-cost prone students.
4.1 Treatment effects on attendance and performance
Table 2 presents estimation results for two measures of attendance as outcome variables:
i) being always present at the tutorial sessions, and ii) the fraction of sessions attended.
Columns (1) and (3) present effects without the inclusion of control variables; columns (2)
and (4) include control variables.
The overall pattern for the full sample is somewhat erratic. The results from equation
(1) suggest that students who received the free treatment are present less often than students
who paid the full price. At the same time, students who received the large discount are
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present more often and are more likely to be always present than students who paid the full
price. These findings are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of control variables. This non-
monotone pattern is neither consistent with a sunk-cost effect nor with an income effect. The
results from equation (2) show that students in the free treatment are less likely to be always
present and are present less often than students from the three other treatments together.
These results disappear when the students who received the large discount are added to those
who received the free treatment (equation (3)). This indicates that the main difference in
attendance is between the students in the free treatment and in the large discount treatment.
These results do not provide evidence in support of a sunk-cost effect in the full sample on
being always present or attendance rates.
Several studies find that people respond to financial incentives during the so-called hot
decision stage shortly after the announcement of a payment scheme, but not anymore during
the cold decision stage (cf. Gneezy and List, 2006; Leuven et al., 2011). Such a pattern is
also present in the study of Arkes and Blumer (1985), who find that the sunk-cost effect is
driven by behavior in the first half of the theater season. To inquire the relevance of the
hot decision stage in our experiment, we look at the impact of the different treatments on
students’ attendance of separate session distinguished by second session, third and last (fourth
or fifth).17 Because students could only participate in the experiment if they attended the
first session, there is no variation in the attendance of that session. The first three columns
of table 3 report the results.18 These show no support for a short-lived sunk-cost effect.
Although the estimated effects of the free treatment on attending the second tutorial session
are significantly negative, they are not different from the estimated effects of this treatment
on attending subsequent sessions (compare the coefficients from the second equation for
different sessions).
Columns (4) to (6) of table 3 report estimates of the effects of the different treatments on
exam performance (passing and grade) and hours spent on the subject of related to the tutorial
course (as reported by the students in the post-treatment questionnaire). Students only have
an outcome for grade if they attended the exam. Results in columns (4) and (5) show that
students who received the free treatment or the large discount treatment have a higher pass
rate than students assigned to the other two treatments. This effect is mainly caused by the
high pass rate of the students who received the large discount. This is also the group with
the highest attendance rate of the exam. If we only compare treatment free to treatment large
17One course (11 students) had only three meetings. Attendance of the third meeting of that course is included
in the analysis of the third meeting as well as in the analysis of the last meeting.
18Table B2 in online Appendix B reports all the results from table 3 from specifications without covariates.
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discount, there is a significant difference in attendance (always present; p=0.02), but not in
pass rates (p=0.86). We find no significant treatment effects for the other outcome variables,
grades and the number of hours spent on the subject.19
4.2 Heterogeneity
In this subsection we inquire whether treatment effects differ across subgroups. First, we
focus on students who report that they (would have) paid the tuition fee for the tutorial course
themselves. So, they did not receive extra money from their parents to pay for the course. In
addition, we inquire whether effects are different for students with above and below median
incomes. Next, following Ashraf et al. (2010), we single out students who are sunk-cost
prone on the basis of hypothetical survey questions.
Income effects. A discount on the full price may in principle affect attendance through
an income effect. Students who pay the full price for the course have less wealth and may,
therefore, decide to work more, perhaps at the expense of lower attendance of the course.
This mechanism works in the opposite direction of the sunk-cost effect and may thus possibly
explain why we find no support for a sunk-cost effect in the full sample.
To examine this possibility we estimated treatment effects for students who are less likely
to be affected by an income effect. We define such students in two ways. First, as students
who did not pay for the course themselves but whose parents paid for the course. We asked
students whether they paid for the tutorial course from their regular income or whether they
received extra money to pay for the tutorial course from their parents.20 Second, we take
students with monthly income above the median monthly income in our sample (Ashraf et al.,
2010 use the same approach). The second test is probably more convincing than the first
because not paying for the course yourself may mitigate the sunk-cost effect at the same
time.
We re-estimated our models including interaction terms of treatment dummies with indi-
cators for paying parents and above median income, respectively. Table 4 reports the results.
If income effects hide the presence of a sunk-cost effect in the full sample, we expect to find
19The data only show a weak positive correlation between the grade and number of hours spent on the course
(0.04) and fraction of tutorial sessions attended (0.06). Furthermore, fraction of tutorial sessions attended is
negatively correlated to number of hours spent on the course (-0.16) which suggests some substitution of effort.
20We phrase the question like this since most students in the Netherlands receive some study allowance
from their parents. We believe the relevant margin is whether students receive extra money, earmarked for the
tutoring course. Paying the course from the general study allowance implies a reduction of their disposable
income whereas receiving extra money for the course does not.
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negative treatment effects for students who did not pay themselves and for students with in-
come above the median. We find no evidence that income effects hide a sunk-cost effect. In
fact we find significantly lower attendance when assigned to the free treatment for students
who paid themselves, but not for students whose parents paid, the opposite of the hypothe-
sized income effect. This result is in line with the hypothesis that a sunk-cost effect is less
likely for students whose parents paid because these students are not affected by the cost of
the course, regardless of the treatment.21 Table 5 presents the results on study performance
for the two subgroups. Only for the outcome variable passed there is some indication of an
income effect: students who did not pay themselves and students with income above the me-
dian are somewhat more likely to pass the exam when they receive a discount. This effect is
mainly driven by the students that received a large discount.
Sunk-cost prone. To examine whether the treatment effects vary with respondents’ sunk-
cost proneness, we present results where we have interacted the treatment variables with the
indicator for sunk-cost-prone students. Tables 6 to 8 show the estimates of the treatment
effects of the sunk-cost-prone and the not sunk-cost-prone students.22 The effects of the
discounts on the attendance of sunk-cost-prone students provide support for the hypothesis
that these students attend the tutorial sessions less often and are less likely to be always
present when they receive a (large) discount on the tuition fee. The results from equation (1)
show that sunk-cost-prone students are 28 percentage points less likely to attend all sessions
when they receive the free treatment compared to paying the full price (column 1a). The
fraction of tutorial sessions that they attend is also 11 percentage points lower than that of
the sunk-cost-prone students who paid the full price (column 2a). The effects on attendance
of receiving the large discount or receiving the small discount are also negative for sunk-
cost-prone students, although these are not statistically significant. In the other equations
the estimated effects of the treatment for sunk-cost-prone students in columns 1a and 2a, are
(with one exception) all significantly negative, implying that students who received a (larger)
21Next to income effects, another potential contaminating factor is that students may perceive a lower price
as a signal of lower quality. We believe that the procedure of letting students draw a closed envelope guarantees
that students will think that the quality of the course is unrelated to the transaction price they paid. Consistent
with this we find no impact of the treatment indicators on students’ appreciation of the courses (results not
reported). Ashraf et al. (2010) conduct a similar test when they use information from their follow-up survey
about respondents’ perception of product quality (p.2402).
22Because sunk-cost proneness is only known for respondents of the post-experiment questionnaire, the num-
ber of observations in this analysis is smaller than the number of observations in the previous subsection. The
smallest cell contains 29 observations (sunk-cost-prone students in the full price treatment). We re-estimated
the effects on attendance of table 2 for the restricted sample to make sure that the different samples are not
causing our results; see Table B3 in online Appendix B.
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discount attended fewer tutorial sessions.23
To inquire whether the sunk-cost effect for sunk-cost-prone students is driven by the hot
decision stage, table 7 looks at students’ attendance in each separate tutorial meeting. For
sunk-cost-prone students the effect on attendance is not yet present in the second session. It
becomes negative but not significantly so for the third session, and for the last session it is
negative and significant. The sunk-cost effect for sunk-cost-prone students is thus not due to
the hot decision stage.
For non-sunk-cost-prone students most estimates in Tables 6 and 7 are positive. For
attendance of the last meeting, some of the estimates are even statistically significant. Non-
sunk-cost-prone students are more likely to attend the last meeting if they received a larger
discount. This result is largely driven by students who received the large discount, they
respond stronger than students who did not have to pay. While these results are somewhat
puzzling, they do not affect the finding that the behavior of sunk-cost-prone students is in
agreement with a sunk-cost effect.
Table 8 reports the effects on performance and hours for sunk-cost-prone students. Based
on the results on attendance we might have expected that sunk-cost-prone students perform
worse when receiving a larger discount. This is not what we find: their lower attendance does
not translate into weaker performance. This is probably due to the fact that the impact of the
discounts on attendance is not large enough. It may also be that the effect of attendance on
exam performance is not so strong. Finally, there might be counteracting effects, such as a
reduction in the number of hours spent on the course, that might offset any positive effects
on performance. The last column of the table , therefore, reports the effect of the treatment
on the number of hours that students spent on the course (self-reported). Since hours spent
on the course includes the time in tutorial sessions there may be some offsetting effects.
4.3 Characterizing sunk-cost-prone students
From the previous analysis we can conclude that only sunk-cost-prone students appear to re-
spond to the discounts. In this subsection we, therefore, characterize sunk-cost-prone students
by regressing the indicator for being sunk-cost prone on a number of observed characteristics.
Next, we discuss the caveats of identifying sunk-cost-prone students in our setting. Table 9
shows the results from these regressions. Economics and business students are less likely to
be sunk-cost prone. This is also true for students who have a high willingness to pay for the
23Column 3 shows results from a regression of sunk-cost proneness on treatment variables and control vari-
ables. We return to these results in the next subsection.
19
Table 6. Effects of treatments on attendance by sunk-cost proneness
Eq Variable Always present Fraction present Sunk-cost
Sunk-cost Others Sunk-cost Others prone
prone prone
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3)
(1) Free -0.28 (0.09)*** 0.05 (0.11) -0.11 (0.04)** 0.03 (0.06) 0.00 (0.09)
LD -0.09 (0.09) 0.17 (0.10) -0.05 (0.04) 0.07 (0.05) -0.02 (0.08)
SD -0.15 (0.11) 0.04 (0.12) -0.07 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.10)
(2) Free -0.19 (0.09)** -0.02 (0.08) -0.07 (0.04)* -0.01 (0.05) 0.03 (0.06)
(3) Free | LD -0.12 (0.07)* 0.10 (0.07) -0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06)
(4) Free | LD | SD -0.18 (0.08)** 0.09 (0.09) -0.08 (0.03)** 0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08)
(5) Discount -0.16 (0.08)** 0.10 (0.08) -0.06 (0.03)* 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.07)
Mean dependent variable 0.89 0.59 0.97 0.82 0.42
full price treatment
Control variables yes yes yes
Observations 295 295 295
Note: The table reports results from three regressions. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) include main effects of treatment dummies
and the sunk-cost-proneness dummy, as well as their interactions. All regressions include controls for gender, age, income, maximum
willingness to pay, course paid by someone else, average study time, first attempt for exam and the estimated probability to pass the
exam without tutorial. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* - estimates significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Furthermore, course fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered by tutorial group.
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tutorial course. Otherwise the results show that the sunk-cost-prone indicator is only weakly
correlated with the student characteristics that we observe.
We follow Ashraf et al. (2010) by using hypothetical survey questions to determine the
sunk-cost proneness of an individual. We asked these questions in the post-treatment survey
because asking them in the pre-treatment survey might make the purpose of the experiment
explicit. Another reason is that Ashraf et al. also asked the hypothetical sunk-cost questions
after the experiment ended. By following their example we avoid that possible differences
in findings can be attributed to the moment when information was collected. A disadvantage
of this procedure is that the construction of subgroups is based on a characteristic which is
potentially affected by the treatments. Table 1 shows, however, that there are no significant
differences in sunk-cost-proneness between the different treatment groups, although those in
the free treatment are 8% points more likely to be categorized as sunk-cost prone than those
in the Full price treatment. The final column in table 6 shows that the differences in sunk-cost
proneness between treatment groups become (substantially) smaller, and remain statistically
insignificant, when (pre-treatment) control variables are included.
Another possible worry with the sunk-cost-proneness indicator might be that students
that did not attend the last class did not fill out the survey at that time. These students either
sent us the questionnaire by email or we administered the questionnaire by phone. Students
that answered the survey by email or phone might be more likely to give responses that
identify them as sunk-cost-prone, in order to rationalize their behavior (not going to the last
class). Therefore, we also include a variable that indicates whether the questionnaire was
administered by email or phone. In columns 3 and 4 of table 9 we see that students that
answered the questionnaire by email or phone are not more likely to be sunk-cost-prone. The
coefficients are negative and not significantly different from zero. The negative sign is the
reverse of what one would expect if people who answer by email or phone try to rationalize
why they did not attend the last session.
Nonetheless, we can not exclude that the findings for sunk-cost-prone students are due to
reverse causation in which treatment assignment and attendance jointly influence their sunk-
cost-prone status. This would be the case if those who did not attend the final class in the
free treatment are more likely than those who did not attend the final class in the full price
treatment to rationalize their behavior ex post by responding to the survey in ways that would
identify them as sunk-cost-prone.24
24We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Table 9. Characterizing sunk-cost-prone students
Variable Sunk-cost prone
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.06 (0.06) -0.00 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07)
Age -0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Monthly income (in euros) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Economics or Business student -0.15 (0.07)** -0.21 (0.07)**
Time spend on study (per week) 0.00 (0.00)
First attempt for exam -0.06 (0.07)
Max. willingness to pay (fraction of price) -0.25 (0.08)**
Predicted prob. passing without tutorial -0.17 (0.17)
Course paid by parents 0.01 (0.06)
Questionnaire by email -0.09 (0.09) -0.07 (0.08)
Questionnaire by phone -0.16 (0.13) -0.23 (0.14)
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07
Observations 295 295 295 295
Note: This table reports results from OLS regressions of the sunk-cost-prone indicator on students background characteristics. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ***,**,* - estimates significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
5 Conclusion
In his often-cited paper, Thaler (1980) argues that he does not believe that consumers ignore
sunk costs in their every day decisions. He refers to some survey questions in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), to examples in which governments fail to ignore sunk costs, and to
introspection to convince the reader. Yet, he acknowledges that gathering evidence to test
the sunk-cost hypothesis is complicated due to selection bias. The recent studies by Ashraf
et al. (2010) and Cohen and Dupas (2010) report about field experiments which have been
designed to take selection issues into account. Both studies fail to find significant sunk-cost
effects.
Our field experiment is comparable to those of Ashraf et al. (2010) and Cohen and Du-
pas (2010), but we believe two features of our design give the sunk-cost hypothesis a better
chance than their designs. First, we offer substantially larger discounts than the previous
authors, which should increase the chance of finding a sunk-cost effect (cf. Garland and
Newport, 1991; Rodrik, 2009). Second, the previous studies look at products where the op-
portunity costs of actually using them appear much smaller than in the case of attending ses-
sions of an extra-curricular course. The opportunity costs of actual usage seems an essential
element of the sunk-cost examples provided by Thaler.
Despite our efforts to stack the deck in favor of finding sunk-cost effects, we find no
24
evidence of such effects for our full sample. Discounts on tuition fees have, on average,
no impact on class attendance in our sample of students who signed up for extra-curricular
courses. We inquired whether the absence of sunk-cost effects can be attributed to income
effects, but find no evidence of that. Finally, we followed Ashraf et al. (2010) who used
hypothetical survey questions to single out individuals with a proneness to take sunk costs
into account. For this subsample we find a significant sunk-cost effect on attendance: sunk-
cost prone students who receive a larger discount are less likely to attend. This does, however,
not translate into better performance for these students. We acknowledge, however, that the
measurement of sunk-cost proneness has some caveats.
While we believe that the size of the discounts and the context of our experiment gave
the sunk-cost hypothesis a better chance than previous studies, it may of course be the case
that we did not go far enough. It may be that with larger discounts and/or higher opportunity
costs of actual usage, a larger share of the sample does not ignore sunk costs.
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A Courses
Table A1. Courses offered at universities
Study program Full price (in C) # groups # students
VU University Amsterdam (VU)
Business Mathematics Economics and Business 75 3 34
Financial Accounting and Bookkeeping Economics and Business 75 2 17
Quantitative Business Analysis Economics and Business 75 1 10
Statistics I (premaster) Economics and Business 75 2 21
Statistics II (premaster) Economics and Business 75 5 57
Mathematics (premaster) Economics and Business 75 3 35
Statistics II Psychology 60 2 16
Meten en Diagnostiek II Psychology 60 2 13
Utrecht University (UU)
Methodology and Statistics I Social Sciences 65 4 34
Methodology and Statistics (premaster) Social Sciences 65 1 10
University of Amsterdam (UvA)
Econometrics Economics and Business 75 2 18
Mathematics and Statistics I Economics and Business 75 4 35
University of Groningen (RUG)
Statistics I A (Dutch) Psychology 65 3 27
Statistics I A (English) Psychology 65 3 23
Statistics II part II Psychology 65 2 21
28
B Additional tables
Table B1. Effects of treatments on response and method of response
Eq Variable Survey Questionnaire Questionnaire
response by email by phone
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Free 0.01 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) -0.03 (0.06)
LD 0.08 (0.03)** -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.05)
SD 0.04 (0.04) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.06)
(2) Free -0.03 (0.03) 0.07 (0.03)* -0.02 (0.05)
(3) Free | LD 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
(4) Free | LD | SD 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05)
(5) Discount 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.04)
Mean dependent variable 0.90 0.04 0.16
full price treatment
Control variables yes yes yes
Observations 327 295 295
Note: All regressions include controls for gender, age, income, maximum willingness to pay, course paid by someone else, average study
time, first attempt for exam and the estimated probability to pass the exam without tutorial. Standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* -
estimates significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Furthermore, course fixed effects are included and standard errors are
clustered by tutorial group.
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C The questionnaires
The questionnaires in this appendix assume a price of C65 and 5 sessions. This was adjusted
depending on the tutorial sessions in question.
Pre-treatment questionnaire
Dear student,
We ask you to take part in a study carried out by the VU and the UvA. In this study you
have a 1/4 chance to receive the following discounts on the fee of the tutoring course: C0,
C10, C55 or C65 discount. By completely filling out the questionnaire below you participate
in the study. Your information will only be used, anonymized, for our research on study
behavior. After filling out the questionnaire, or choosing not to, the fee has to be paid and the
potential discount will be determined. If you have any questions regarding the study you can
ask them at that time.
I Personal information
1. Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Student number: . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Phone number: 06-. . . . . . . . .
4. Email address: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Gender: 0Male0 Female
6. Age: . . . . . . . years
II Education
7. Since when do you study?
Since 20...
8. Home many hours a week do you spend on your studies, on average?
. . . . . . . hours per week
9. How many hours do you expect to spend on this course, including the hours spend in
tutoring courses?
32
. . . . . . . hours per week
10. Why did you choose to follow tutoring courses for this subject?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11. Did you take tutorial courses through [name of the study association] before? If so, for
which subject?
0 Yes for the subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 No
12. Did you take the exam for this subject before? If so, how often?
0 Yes, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . time(s) before0 No
13. How many of the 5 classes do you intend to follow?
0 1 class0 2 classes0 3 classes0 4 classes0 5 classes
14. How large do you estimate the probability that you will pass the exam?
Without taking this tutoring course: . . . . . . . . . %
After following this tutoring course: . . . . . . . . . %
III Background
15. With which type of math did you graduate high school?
0Math A0Math B0Math C0Math D0 Other, i.e. . . . ..
16. With what math grade did you graduate high school (In case of a non-Dutch exam,
please translate the grade to a comparable Dutch grade)?
. . . . . . . . . . . .
17. Did you receive extra money from your parents to pay for this course or did you pay for
it out of your regular income?
0 From regular income0 Extra contribution of parents0 Other, i.e. . . . . . . ..
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18. What is your average monthly income (including student aid and contributions from
your parents.)?
C . . . . . . .
19. What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay for these tutoring courses?
C . . . . . . .
20. Do you have friends in this tutorial group? If so, what are their names?
0 Yes
Names friends:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 No
34
Post-treatment questionnaire
Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Student number: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Teacher:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Course:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Day: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time: . . . . . . . . . . . .
In addition to the usual evaluation questions some questions were added for the study of the
UvA and the VU in which most of you participated. The answers to this questionnaire will
be treated confidentially and anonymous and will only be used for this study.
General:
The probability I would recommend this tutoring class to a friend is:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
Booklet:
The quality of the booklet was:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
The booklet covers all subjects in the course:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
All important subjects in the course were covered with enough assignments:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
Teacher:
The teacher was knowledgeable about all important subjects
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
The teacher motivated me to try my best
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
The teacher was good
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
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Other participants:
Other participants were involved and worked hard during the tutoring classes:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
Other participants were well prepared for the tutoring classes:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
Final evaluation
In general I assess these tutoring courses with:
(lowest) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (highest)
Would you participate in another tutoring course organized by [Name of the study
association] in the future? If not, why?
0 Yes0 No, because .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attendance
How many and which of the tutoring classes did you miss?
Class 1: 0 Present0 Partly absent0 Absent
Class 2: 0 Present0 Partly absent0 Absent
Class 3: 0 Present0 Partly absent0 Absent
Class 4: 0 Present0 Partly absent0 Absent
Class 5: 0 Present0 Partly absent0 Absent
If you missed 1 or more classes, what were the reasons for your absence (multiple answers
possible)
0 I was ill0 Something else intervened0 I didn’t think the class would be useful0
Other, which is . . . . . . ..
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Course
How many hours did you spent on this course, including the hours spent in tutoring courses
. . . . . . . hours per week
How large do you estimate the probability that you will pass the exam?
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. %
Discount
Participants in this tutoring course were able to get a discount. The size of the discount was
randomly determined. How large was the discount you received?
C . . . . . . .
In case you got a discount, what did you do with the money?
0 I gave it back to my parents
0 I added it to my regular income
0 I spent it on something special, which is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 Other, which is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
0 I didn’t get a discount
What did you think of the fact that people could get a discount?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Background
Indicate for each of the following statements the extent to which you agree with it.
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
(completely disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (completely agree)
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I certainly feel useless at times.
(completely disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (completely agree)
I prefer to something that challenges my thinking skills over something that doesn’t require
me to think.
(completely disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (completely agree)
I trust my initial hunches.
(completely disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (completely agree)
Suppose you bought a bottle of juice for C2,-. When you start to drink it, you realize you
don’t really like the taste.
Would you finish drinking it? 0 Yes0 No
Now suppose you bought exactly the same bottle of juice for C5,-. When you start to drink
it, you realize you don’t really like the taste.
Would you finish drinking it? 0 Yes0 No
Now suppose you bought exactly the same bottle of juice for C1,-. When you start to drink
it, you realize you don’t really like the taste.
Would you finish drinking it? 0 Yes0 No
General remarks about the tutoring course
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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